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Accelerationism, Prometheanism  
and Mythotechnesis
Simon O’Sullivan
In a previous meditation on accelerationism—in relation to a modality of art 
practice that I gave the name (following Sun Ra and Mike Kelly) myth-sci-
ence—I attempted to get to grips with the concept of hyperstition, and, more 
particularly, with the mythos of Nick Land.1 Myth-science, in that essay, was de-
fined as the production of alternative fictions and the calling forth of a different 
kind of subjectivity attendant on this.2 Here, in the second part of my enquiry, 
beginning with a commentary on two essays by two more recent acceleration-
ist thinkers—Reza Negarestani and Ray Brassier (both of whom were inspired 
by Land)—I want to move from myth-science to a concept of ‘mythotechnesis’, 
when this is again defined as a ‘fictioning’ of reality, but also as a form of libidinal 
engineering involving the construction of what David Burrows and I call path-
eme-matheme assemblages. 3 Just as an attempt was made in my previous essay 
to differentiate myth-science from hyperstition per se, so, here, I attempt to dif-
ferentiate mythotechnesis from an overly rational (and technological) Promet-
heanism, whilst also learning from the latter (mythotechnesis might be under-
stood as a form of aesthetics after finitude in this last sense).4 
        1. See ‘Accelerationism, Hyperstition and Myth-Science’, in Tim Matts, Ben Noys and Dane Suther-
land (eds.), Accelerationism and the Occult, New York, Punctum Books, 2015.
        2. In terms of Sun Ra see Kodwo Eshun’s discussion, ‘Synthesizing the Ominiverse’, in More Brilliant 
than the Sun: Adventures in Sonic Fiction, London, Quartet, 1998, pp. 154-163). Mike Kelley, in an essay on 
Öyvind Fahlström (‘Myth Science’, in Öyvind Fahlström: The Installations, Ostfildern, Hatje Cantz, 1995, 
pp. 19-27) links the term more particularly to an expanded contemporary art practice.
        3. Both Negarestani and Brassier themselves point to their indebtedness to Land. The former in a 
footnote to the essay ‘Drafting the Inhuman: Conjectures on Capitalism and Organic Necrocracy’, in 
Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman (eds.), The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and 
Realism, Melbourne, re.press, 2011, pp. 182-201; the latter in the ‘Inroduction’, written with Robin Mack-
ay, to Nick Land, Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987-2007, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2013, pp. 1-54. 
        4. What follows draws on and develops some of the arguments first sketched out in my review essay (of 
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ACCELERATIONISM (AND THE INHUMAN)
I began my previous essay by looking to the proposals for an accelerationist 
aesthetics made by Alex Williams (one of the co-authors of the ‘Manifesto for an 
Accelerationist Politics’) in his essay ‘Escape Velocities’, and to the idea that, as 
well as hyperstition, this aesthetics might take the form of ‘processes of epistem-
ic conceptual navigation’.5 Williams names Negarestani as the key figure in the 
development of this philosophical but also—for Williams—aesthetic project. I 
want to return to this particular proposal as a way into Negarestani’s own take 
on accelerationism:
The spatialized conception of the navigation and ramification of concep-
tual spaces at the core of Negarestani’s notion of epistemic acceleration 
has an immediately aesthetic dimension, a highly visualized approach, 
grounded in the mathematics of topos theory. This abstract mathemati-
cal aesthetic of gesture, navigation, limitropism, and pathway-finding re-
routes the philosophy of mathematics away from a basis in set theory and 
logic, and instead seeks an ultimately geometric ground.6
In fact, Williams’ fourth proposal also connects with Negarestani’s outline for 
a renewed Prometheanism, naming, as it does, a more design-orientated pro-
gramme to run alongside the strictly philosophical. Again, it is worth quoting:
Finally, we have the aesthetic of action in complex systems. What must be 
coupled to complex systems analysis and modeling is a new form of action: 
improvisatory and capable of executing a design through a practice which 
works with the contingencies it discovers only in the course of its acting. 
This can be best described through the Ancient Greek concept of metis, a 
particular mode of cunning craft.7
The first question I want to ask is whether these two forms of aesthetics 
(very broadly construed)—conceptual navigation and a pragmatic metis—have 
a place in art practice, especially one conceived of as a libidinal engineering that 
might operate against what Gilles Deleuze, following William Burroughs, once 
called ‘control’ (and more specifically the production of a normative and stand-
ardized subjectivity that is attendant on this). I am also interested in what might 
be left out of this particular aesthetic (if, indeed, it can be called as such)—that 
is to say, the limits of philosophical accelerationism when it comes to art prac-
tice and the production of subjectivity.
Certainly Negarestani’s key accelerationist essay—‘The Labour of the In-
human’—is orientated against a reified idea—or image—of the human that, 
for Negarestani, can restrict the possibilities of thought, and, indeed, of poli-
tics more generally (the ‘human’ as control we might say).8 In fact, it is with-
#Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader) ‘The Missing Subject of Accelerationism’, Mute, available at: www.
metamute.org/editorial/articles/missing-subject-accelerationism (accessed 14 August 2015). In that es-
say the term ‘myth-science’ was used to describe the practices and productions that in the present arti-
cle come under the heading ‘mythotechnesis’). 
        5. Alex Williams, ‘Escape Velocities’, E-Flux, no. 46, 2013, p. 9.
        6. Williams, ‘Escape Velocities’, p. 9. 
        7. Williams, ‘Escape Velocities’, p. 9-10.
        8. Reza Negarestani, ‘The Labour of the Inhuman’ in Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian (eds.), 
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in a ‘kitsch Marxism’ that Negarestani sees this particular yoke (the ‘consump-
tion of norms’) at play, and, in this, his essay harks back to Nick Land’s notion 
of a broadly Left ‘Cathedral’ as that which places a break on the Promethean 
impulse.9 Negarestani’s essay is not, however, antihuman (the labour of the in-
human is defined against the antihumanist refusal to revise and construct), but, 
rather, involves a continuation or ‘extended elaboration’ (precisely, an accelera-
tion) of the humanist project itself.10 
This is to attend to an inhuman impulse that is, as it were, ‘within’ the 
human, when the former names the commitment to an on-going experimen-
tal but also rational process—of conceptual navigation—and the latter names 
the fetters on this (the ‘folk’ (everyday and common-sensical) sense of a human 
self—or ‘myth of the given’—that can limit this other adventure insofar as it 
relies on pre-existing categories and definitions). The labour of the inhuman 
then involves the continuing interrogation of the category of the human, a 
program of endless revision and updating that is itself a commitment to always 
reassess previous commitments. This, we might say, is the human’s self-over-
coming through reason, albeit of a specifically experimental and speculative 
type.11 
In fact, for Negarestani, the human (as a kind of processual project) is de-
fined by reason, and more particularly, by the relation between seeing and 
doing (inferences and actions) and the task of giving and asking for reasons. 
This manifests itself most obviously in a shared language and common vo-
cabulary (alongside other ‘discursive practices’) and it is this ‘communal see-
ing and doing’ that defines the labour of the inhuman as a collective, indeed, 
Universalist project (as well as marking the difference between sapience and 
sentience).
Although the case for a labour of the inhuman is compelling, we might note 
a first caveat in relation to the emphasis on language and discourse, insofar as 
the opposition Negarestani draws between ‘stabilised communication through 
concepts’ and ‘chaotically unstable types of response and communication’, that 
itself leads to a certain definition of the human and the privileging of the discur-
sive, leaves out other forms of thought that might be said to operate between, or 
even outside of, these poles (LI, pp. 431-2). Indeed, it seems clear that art prac-
tice, for example, tacks between these two, if, indeed, its logics could be said to 
be staked out by them at all. Certainly questions of aesthetics—and, crucially, 
of affect—are left aside in this particular labour, but, more generally, there is 
also the question, following Félix Guattari, of a-signifying semiotics and other 
forms of expression that do not operate on a discursive register (or not exclusive-
#Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2015, pp. 427-66 (referred to in text as LI).
        9. See my discussion of Land and Neoreaction—or NRx—in the essay mentioned in footnote 1.
        10. François Laruelle, in his focus on reclaiming and foregrounding a ‘generic’ humanity has some-
thing in common with Negarestani’s labour of the inhuman in this sense, although, it has to be said, 
the non-philosophical project per se orientates itself against any philosophical Mastery—and with that 
a strictly philosophical definition of the human.
        11. We might note the connections with Alain Badiou here and his proposal that a subject, as op-
posed to a human, is animated by a certain fidelity, or ‘idea’, that ‘raises’ them above the creaturely. 
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ly). These other, often complex semiotics (what Deleuze and Guattari call be-
comings) somewhat complicate the definition of the human as solely a ration-
al animal. 
For Negarestani, however, to dispense with—or even underplay—discur-
sive practices in particular and the ‘space of reason’ more generally means 
‘everything lapses either toward the individual or toward a noumenal alteri-
ty where a contentless plurality without any demand or duty can be effortlessly 
maintained’ (LI, p. 434). Although this is to effectively dismiss practices outside 
of the space of reason, it is also clear that these discursive practices—and indeed 
reason itself—are, for Negarestani, not to be thought of in terms of the habitu-
al and typical (to rely on already existing concepts and categories in this sense 
would be to promote an antihumanism). As such, although Negarestani implic-
itly positions himself against a thinker like Henri Bergson (and, by extension, 
any vitalist ontology) it might equally be claimed that a form of intuition—or 
what we might call a thinking outside of ourselves—is at stake in these non-rea-
sonable operations of reason. 12 
For Negarestani the labour of ‘seeing and doing’ implies an interventionist 
attitude to systems and the mobilisation of atypical forms of thought (‘synthet-
ic forms of inference’). This constant updating of one’s commitments (which, 
again, involves a re-vision of the category of the human itself ) cannot but be 
experimental—guided by ‘complex heuristics’ that in themselves produce new 
frontiers of action and understanding. A system that does not intervene and in-
terrogate its own norms of understanding and action—again, does not renew its 
commitments—is irrelevant at best and obstructive at worse to this other funda-
mentally constructive and affirmative project.
In terms of aesthetics, and following my brief comment about intuition 
above, a key question is what the more speculative types of reason, and ‘ab-
ductive inference’, might ‘look’ like (especially as the labour of the inhuman it-
self accelerates ever further beyond familiar categories and concepts). Could 
it be, in fact, that it is within art practice that we see complex sets of heuristics 
(some of which are not conceptual) at work? Certainly art is involved in ‘ma-
nipulable, experimental, and synthetic forms of inference whose consequences 
are not simply dictated by premises or initial conditions’ (LI, p. 436). Indeed, 
in many ways, this kind of experimental pragmatics—metis—seems a pretty 
good definition of artistic practice.13 Negarestani gives a footnote here on ab-
        12. Bergson, no doubt, is who Negarestani, Brassier and others have in mind when they contrast the 
private thinker-mystic—and idea of intuition—to a rule based and reasonable sapience that grounds 
a collective ‘us’. The question here is whether Bergsonian intuition, or indeed Deleuze-Guattarian be-
comings, are private and individualistic in this sense, or whether they are an instance of the world 
thinking through us—or, more simply, a connection between ‘us’ and the world. I attend further to 
this—in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming—in my ‘Memories of a Deleuzian: To 
Think is Always to Follow the Witches Flight’, Henry Somers-Hall, Jeff Bell and James Williams (eds.), 
A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2016.
        13. In relation to this Negarestani does turn to contemporary art in his essay on Jean-Luc Moulène, 
Torture Concrete: Jean-Luc Moulène and the Protocol of Abstraction, New York, Sequence Press, 2014. Here the 
labour of the inhuman becomes the labour of abstraction when this names a similar project of turning 
away from reified images of thought (especially, here, those that rely on notions of interiority and ex-
teriority) and, indeed, a continuous and experimental redefinition of the latter (involving ‘bootstrap-
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ductive inference that is worth quoting at length: 
Abductive inference, or abduction, was first expounded by Charles Sand-
ers Peirce as a form of creative guessing or hypothetical inference which 
uses a multimodal and synthetic form of reasoning to dynamically expand 
its capacities. While abductive inference is divided into different types, 
all are non-monotonic, dynamic, and non-formal. They also involve con-
struction and manipulation, the deployment of complex heuristic strate-
gies, and non- explanatory forms of hypothesis generation. Abductive rea-
soning is an essential part of the logic of discovery, epistemic encounters 
with anomalies and dynamic systems, creative experimentation, and ac-
tion and understanding in situations where both material resources and 
epistemic cues are limited or should be kept to a minimum. (LI, p. 436, 
footnote 7)
Might we make a further claim that these abductive inferences, and espe-
cially ‘non-explanatory forms of hypothesis generation’ are similar to what I 
have elsewhere called fictioning? 14 This involves an experimental (but also lived) 
modelling of different realities that proceeds through imagining and imaging, 
performing and making, alongside more speculative reasoning (and, in this last 
sense, art practice itself often has a conceptual aspect to it). Certainly this kind 
of art practice involves the suspension of dominant habits of thought, operates 
outside of pre-existing frameworks and protocols, questions accepted ‘realities’ 
and so forth—as well as, crucially, producing something that is of one but not 
of one at the same time. There is a kind of politics implied here: in a situation 
in which options are increasingly limited (a veritable hemming in of subjectivity 
by neoliberalism), these forms of fictioning—again, the production of a different 
reality—become crucial and in and of themselves politically charged. 
In Part 2 of Negarestani’s essay the experimental labour of the inhuman is 
portrayed as more specifically navigational, and, indeed, one might say, more 
restricted—or, at least, more rigorous and focussed in its unfolding:
Interaction with the rational system of commitments follows a navigation-
al paradigm in which the ramifications of an initial commitment must be 
compulsively elaborated and navigated in order for this commitment to 
make sense as an undertaking. It is the examination of the rational fallout 
of making a commitment, the unpacking of its far-reaching consequences, 
and the treating of these ramifications as paths to be explored that shapes 
commitment to humanity as a navigational project. Here navigation is 
not only a survey of a landscape whose full scope is not given; it is also an 
exercise in the non-monotonic procedures of steering, plotting out routes, 
ping’ from the local to the global). Art itself is positioned as one mode of thought amongst others in this 
sense—a diversification which fosters novelty and exploration and, as such, serves to redefine the unity 
of all modes of thought. In relation to art practice per se Negarestani also lays out a compelling case for 
the reciprocal determination of thought on matter/matter on thought, itself ‘led’ by the positioning of 
‘generative points’ that destabilize pre-existing images and habits. It is here that he also outlines an idea 
of knots—between the mathematical and the libidinal for example—as a preeminent example of this 
abstraction (and which, as such, have something in common with my own outline of patheme-matheme 
assemblages) (see also footnote 27 below on Moulène’s idea of the protocol). 
        14. See my essay ‘Deleuze Against Control: from Fictioning to Myth-Science, Theory Culture Socie-
ty, vol. 33, no. 7-8’.
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suspending navigational preconceptions, rejecting or resolving incompat-
ible commitments, exploring the space of possibilities, and understanding 
each path as a hypothesis leading to new paths or a lack thereof—transits 
as well as obstructions. (LI, pp. 443-4)
As Williams remarks this is a highly visual (and, again, compelling) account 
of the adventure of reason—abstracted from any specific content and under-
stood as a specifically geometric project (in another essay Negarestani defines 
geometry as ‘the controlled organization of space as a precondition for the ar-
ticulation of the unarticulated and the extraction of intelligibility’).15 The routes 
and pathways are themselves the hypotheses, with the labour of the inhuman 
becoming a form of experimental cartography. That said, despite the focus on 
experimentation, there is still a certain normativity at play here insofar as this 
navigation involves the positing and unpacking of consequences for humanity 
per se. Thought might be untied from a specific telos, but it is, nevertheless, di-
rected toward the immanent ‘evolution’ of the human. If art practice is also in-
volved in these forms of navigation—again, an experimental cartography that 
is both conceptual and affective—it seems to me that this is not always in the 
service of any ethics in this sense. If art practice is a labour, it is one untethered 
from the human (or, indeed, the inhuman). 
For Negarestani this conceptual navigation involves a positive feedback loop 
effectuated by the deracinating of any origin or fixed definition of the human 
insofar as new definitions—inhumanism—feed back to inform the very idea of 
the human. As Negarestani remarks: ‘As soon as you commit to human, you ef-
fectively start erasing its canonical portrait backwards from the future’ (LI, p. 
446)). This revisioning and updating is the movement of reason itself, its auton-
omous self-actualisation through the superseding of any previous idea of what it 
‘is’ (and, in this sense, as Negarestani says, his project must be seen in the tradi-
tion of Enlightenment thinking). We might note a further connection with Nick 
Land here, insofar as the labour of the inhuman shares with teleoplexy (the time 
loops of hyperstition) both a certain autonomous and self-evaluating character, 
as well as a strange temporality: it retroactively operates back on the past/pres-
ent from a future it has helped construct (not least in the feeding back of the con-
sequences of its understandings and actions into its own self-definition).
The self-actualisation of reason (which turns out to be the real labour of the 
inhuman) involves the bootstrapping of more complex functions from simple 
ones.16 Reason’s self-assemblage as it were which, in itself, ultimately involves 
the augmentation of any given reality (hence the Prometheanism). But reality 
(including the reality of a life) is not simply a construct of reason. Or, to put this 
another way: reason might well outstrip the human (understood as a particular 
psycho-biological platform), but the human (as complex psycho-biological enti-
ty) outstrips reason. In terms of any Prometheanism, this is not to instate a bor-
der between the given and the made exactly (more on this below), but it is to say 
        15. Reza Negarestani, Torture Concrete, p. 17.
        16. Negarestani is clear, however, that this self-actualization needs must be accompanied by commu-
nal assessment and methodological collectivity; that is, by a politics.
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that the made must involve other procedures and materials beyond the concep-
tual. We might make the case here that the augmentation of reality by the con-
ceptual and technological, but also the affective and fictional is the raison d’être 
of art practice, at least post Duchamp. 
It is at this point that we get one of the most compelling parts of Negarestani’s 
essay which describes this process of construction and revision (and the heuris-
tics mentioned above) as an ‘engineering epistemology’ in which attention is giv-
en to the different levels and hierarchies of any given system (with ‘lower level 
entities’ operating as guidance and enhancement of upper levels, and the lat-
ter reciprocally operating back down to correct and ‘renormalize’ so as to allow 
further construction and exploration) (LI, pp. 460-1). Negarestani suggests the 
compelling idea of an engineering loop between these different levels—and, as 
such, the labour of the inhuman is also to draw a map of syntheses that ‘ensures 
a form of descriptive plasticity and prescriptive versatility’ (LI, p. 463). Again, 
could it be that art practice is also involved in this kind of a ‘patchwork struc-
ture’, as Negarestani calls it—of belief and action—and, in particular, that it 
involves its own engineering loops between different levels albeit these must be 
seen as affective as well as conceptual (the mapping out of a Spinozist—molec-
ular—unconscious in this sense, or a microphysics of force as Nietzsche might 
have it).17 
In this revisionary programme the figure of the engineer becomes the key 
conceptual personae (in place of the ‘advocate of transgression or militant 
        17. In an earlier essay—‘Globe of Revolution: An Afterthought on Geophilosophical Realism’, Iden-
tities: Journal of Politics, Gender and Culture, vol. 8, no. 2, 2011, pp. 25-54—Negarestani writes about these 
navigational loops in terms of different syntheses between the local and the global, or, more specifically, 
between a local horizon (man, the earth, and so forth) and the ‘open universal continuum’ out of which 
they have been cut. Here the trauma of excision defines us as individuated beings, but also points to the 
possibility of other pathways to the open besides those that position the latter as an ‘unbindable exor-
bitance’. Indeed, man himself is made up of these nested ‘traumata’ (that go back to the inorganic) and 
the role of the revolutionary subject, for Negarestani, is to connect them together, to ‘bring about all 
types of eccentric neighbourhoods between regional horizons of the universal continuum and establish 
topological transfer between seemingly discrete regional domains’ (Reza Negarestani, ‘Globe of Rev-
olution’, p. 38). It is in this sense that the revolutionary work of what Negarestani also calls the ‘Mod-
ern Man’ has something in common with the labour of the inhuman insofar as it involves a kind of 
construction that is attendant on an ‘unrestricted synthetic vision’ and the drawing of a geophilosophi-
cal navigational map (Negarestani’s thesis on geotrauma has something in common with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s own writings on geophilosophy in this last sense—but it also resonates with Badiou’s theory 
of the subject insofar as the Modern Man is defined by his particular relation to the open (trauma oper-
ates in a similar fashion to the event)). Negarestani’s essay is concerned with different types of syntheses, 
diagnosing an exogenic response to the outside (resulting in a terrestrial myopia), whilst also calling for 
‘alternative modes of openness’. As he remarks: ‘the responsibility of the revolutionary subject is to adopt 
and grow these germs [defined earlier as: ‘asymptopic behaviours, neighbourhoods, overlaps and uni-
versal passages between regional fields’] as alternative modes of openness’ (Reza Negarestani, ‘Globe 
of Revolution’, p. 52). Might we make the case that these alternative modes of openness, by definition, 
cannot be restricted to one domain of thought—and that, as such, they will include other work besides 
the conceptual (certainly Negarestsani’s comments about how the counter-revolutionary is defined ‘by 
their reactionary and restricted attitude against alternatives, their dismissal of tactical improvisation 
and unwritten plans, and their fear of asymmetrical fields of synthesis or relation to the open’ would 
imply an openness to this idea (Reza Negarestani, ‘Globe of Revolution’, p. 35). It seems to me that the 
accessing of ever deeper nested trauma (understood as points of passage to the open) cannot but involve 
practices that are, as it were, atypical and non habitual—and that these needs must involve attention to 
the affective insofar this is the very register of trauma, at least on and in the human subject. 
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communitarian’) and liberation becomes a work of construction—a labour—
that amounts to an ‘unlearning of slavery’ (LI, pp. 464-5). ‘Freedom is intelligence’ 
as Negarestani puts it (LI, p. 465). In passing, we might note Michel Foucault’s 
late work on technologies of the self here, and, more specifically, Foucault’s 
remarks about the ‘Care of the Self ’ in which the decision by the subject to 
self-apply certain ethical codes brings about a kind of space of freedom.18 For 
Foucault, however, these practices are as much a-signifying and affective as 
they are conceptual and discursive—although in both cases—Foucault and 
Negarestani—it is a kind of autonomous decision making that, ultimately, de-
fines freedom. 
The artist has certainly often been positioned as a transgressor—as outside 
(or against) ‘the’ system—just as more activist-artists have been positioned as 
critics of the same. Negarestani suggests a third way: the working within a sys-
tem that is itself dynamic and progressive. Could we understand the artist as en-
gineer in this sense? On one level, to return to Foucault, this is an injunction to 
treat life as experimental matter, as a ‘work of art’ to be produced. On another 
it might mean the construction of artefacts that augment life, though not neces-
sarily in a overly technologically determined manner. It might also be a combi-
nation of these two: the libidinal engineering of new and different forms of syn-
thetic life. I will return to this—and develop some of my other comments on 
Negarestani’s important text (especially around the absence of the affective)—
in the final section of this essay. 
PROMETHEANISM (CONTRA FINITUDE)
Like Negarestani, Ray Brassier’s philosophical Prometheanism—as laid 
out in his own accelerationist essay, ‘Prometheanism and its Critics’—identi-
fies a constructive and future-orientated impulse within the human, one that is, 
again, rule-based and rational and that, ultimately, might be pitched against all-
too-human preoccupations such as finitude.19 For Brassier the category of fini-
tude also includes birth and suffering—which, along with death, are typically 
        18. See, for example, Foucault’s The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de France 1981-82, F. 
Gros (ed.), trans. G. Burchell, London, Palgrave, 2005. Interestingly, Nick Srnicek and Alex William’s 
‘Manifesto for an Accelerationist Politics’, in Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian (eds.), #Accelerate: 
The Accelerationist Reader, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2015, pp. 349-378—which lays out a Promethean pol-
itics in parallel with Negarestani’s philosophy—makes some cryptic remarks regarding the need for 
‘self mastery’ that might be said to resonate with Foucault’s Care of the Self: ‘We need to posit a col-
lectively controlled legitimate vertical authority in addition to distributed forms of sociality’ (Nick Sr-
nicek and Alex Williams, ‘Manifesto’, p. 358). For a more detailed account of the Care of the Self—
in relation to the production of subjectivity and Lacan’s Ethics of Psychoanalysis, see Chapter 2, ‘The 
Care of the Self versus the Ethics of Desire: Two Diagrams of the Production of Subjectivity (and of the 
Subject’s Relation to Truth) (Foucault versus Lacan)’, of my On the Production of Subjectivity: Five Diagrams 
of the Finite-Infinite Relation, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 59-88. It is worth pointing out 
that the idea of freedom that Foucault outlines—the product of a certain work on the self by the self—
has resonances with Negarestani’s own definition of freedom as a work of the human, albeit, again, for 
the latter it is a specifically rule based—rational—work: ‘Rather than liberation, the condition of free-
dom is a piecewise structural and functional accumulation and refinement that takes shape as a pro-
ject of self-cultivation’ (LI, p. 464).
        19. Ray Brassier, ‘Prometheanism and its Critics’, in Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian (eds.), 
#Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2015, pp. 469-87 (referred to in text as PC).
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portrayed as essential and existential givens—limits as it were—that define us 
as human (Brassier has Heidegger and his followers in mind). Brassier’s argu-
ment is that the positing of an existential authenticity of the given (as in the ‘hu-
man’, ‘life’, Dasein or what have you) against the made means that Promethean-
ism (simply, for Brassier, the idea that we can (re)make ourselves and our world 
without limits) is ruled out tout court or seen as a sin (involving, as it does the her-
esy of making, or attempting to make, the given). 
In fact, in a recourse to Hegel, Brassier suggests that this Prometheanism, 
with its introduction of a disequilibrium into the world, is also the ‘enabling con-
dition of cognitive processes’ in general insofar as the latter cannot but involve 
opposition (understanding) in tandem with conciliation (reason) (PC, p. 470). 
Prometheanism is not an attempt to heal any subject-object division, but is pre-
cisely enabled by it. Alienation begets freedom in this sense.
Brassier’s particular take on finitude, and specifically his implicit idea of 
what suffering might be, could be fine-tuned somewhat insofar as from a certain 
perspective it is not suffering itself that is the given but, impermanence which, 
when encountered by a subject desiring permanence, causes suffering as a sec-
ondary effect (this is the fundamental insight of Buddhism). The possibility of 
a state of subjectivity that does not rail against impermanence (does not desire 
permanence), in particular one that does not identify itself as a separate self (and 
thus does not suffer in this sense), but instead ‘identifies’ with the world in gen-
eral (and its impermanence)—or perhaps does not identify at all—might be said 
to be gestured towards by Brassier in what he tantalizingly calls a ‘subjectivism 
without selfhood’ (although, no doubt for Brassier such a state is to be rationally 
and scientifically produced rather than through any meditative practice) (PC, p. 
471). Brassier’s Prometheanism might be said to involve the promise of an exist-
ence beyond finitude (an infinite subject perhaps?) in this sense. 
Indeed, for Brassier, finitude is less the determining factor of any given sub-
jectivity per se than, again, a fetter on the Promethean impulse itself (this desire 
to go beyond finitude is a refrain of accelerationism in more or less all its artic-
ulations). As with Negarestani there is then both a critique of the human (again, 
as folk or ‘manifest image’ and thus as fetter), and an affirmation of it (as sapi-
ent rational being—as ‘scientific image’) and, as such, potentially unbounded.
We might note a specifically technological variant of this contemporary 
Prometheanism in Benedict Singleton’s writings (including his own essay in 
#Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader), in the impulse to escape planetary gravi-
ty and thus the ultimate ‘prison’: earth.20 Hence, also, the accelerationist inter-
est in the Russian cosmists (and the inclusion in the aforementioned Reader of 
‘The Common Task’ by Nicolai Fedorov ).21 As Robin Mackay and Armen Ava-
        20. Benedict Singleton, ‘Maximum Jailbreak’, in Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian (eds.), #Ac-
celerate: The Accelerationist Reader, Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2014, pp. 491-507.
        21. Nicolai Fedorov, ‘The Common Task’ in Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian (eds.), #Accelerate: 
The Accelerationist Reader, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2014, pp. 85-90. We might note here a figure important 
to the accelerationist aspects of Anti-Oedipus and one similarly interested in leaving the planet: William 
Burroughs. For the latter such an escape, however, was to be achieved not through the latest technolog-
ical prosthesis (at least as presented by NASA) but by various aesthetic practices involving time-space 
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nessian’s ‘Introduction’ to the same Reader suggests, Singleton’s interest in the 
technological ‘platforms’ that capitalism produces, and the concomitant naviga-
tional spaces opened up by them, parallels Negarestani and Brassier’s own pro-
jects of conceptual navigation (Singleton was also the first to deploy the concept 
of metis in relation to the latter).22 
In passing we might also briefly quote a contemporary anti-Promethean 
thinker so as to sharpen the differences. Here is Simon Critchley from the very 
beginning of his relatively recent The Faith of the Faithless:
Our culture is endlessly beset with Promethean myths of the overcoming 
of the human condition, whether through the fantasy of artificial intelli-
gence, contemporary delusions about robotics, cloning and genetic ma-
nipulation or simply though cryogenics and cosmetic surgery. We seem to 
have enormous difficulty in accepting our limitedness, our finiteness, and 
this failure is a cause of much tragedy.23
For Critchley the human tragedy is not finitude, but precisely the wil-
ful denial of it. Indeed, finitude, in Critchley’s account, defines authentic hu-
man existence and experience. Such a position, according to Brassier, main-
tains a structure of transcendence in relation to the human, implying (when 
not simply asserting) that there is a difference in kind between the latter and 
other forms of life (it also, crucially, implies that finitude—and suffering—is 
meaningful). Following Heidegger (and Kant) this is an ontological difference 
that implies that we can never wholly know ourselves (or ‘jump on our own 
shadow’ as Brassier puts it) (PC, p. 476). Or, at least, if we do objectivate our-
selves—make ourselves into an object of knowledge (a particularly complex 
machine)—then we risk losing something essential about our humanness (and, 
indeed, risk losing any position from which to maintain an ‘ought’ or other 
normative principles).24 
This anti-Promethean philiosophical attitude might be summed up with the 
idea that man cannot be understood as merely a ‘catalogue of empirical proper-
ties’, and that there is also a fragile equilibrium between the made and the giv-
en that ought to be respected (or, more simply, the idea that the world was made 
at all) (PC, p. 477). Brassier’s audacity (which gives his essay its striking quality) 
is simply to question this ought, this idea of a given equilibrium (or, again, the 
idea that the world was made at all), and thus to ‘free’ the Promethean impulse 
itself and with it the potential of the human (who, in this sense, does not have a 
defining limit; Brassier’s Prometheanism, as he remarks, refuses the ontologiza-
disruptions: the cut-up, dream-machine and so forth (thanks to David Burrows for this point)).
        22. Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian, ‘Inroduction’, in Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian 
(eds.), #Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2014, pp. 32-3.
        23. Simon Critchley, The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theolog y, London, Verso, 2012, 
p. 1. I want to thank Nicole Denham for alerting me to this explicitly non-accelerationist character of 
Critchley’s writings.
        24. We might note here that Negarestani’s labour of the inhuman, insofar as it involves a commit-
ment, proceeds from an ought, one that arises from an idea that there is a difference of the human qua 
reason. On the one hand then Negarestani provides an ethics, in Spinoza’s sense, to Brassier’s cold-
er empirical work—but, on the other, Negarestani might be accused, from Brassier’s perspective, of 
smuggling in a difference in kind—an ontologization of the human?—under the cover of reason itself.
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tion of finitude) (PC, p. 478). 
It seems to me that art practice, at least of a kind, is also Promethean in 
this sense insofar as it refuses a certain kind of finitude (one thinks, again, of 
Duchamp and his ‘explorations’ beyond typical space-time) but also other lim-
its more generally (one thinks of the very movement of the avant-garde that spe-
cifically refuses any predetermined parameters or logics of what art is). Indeed, 
art practice also interferes in the equilibrium of the world—its fictions disrupt 
the normal run of things, or, philosophically speaking, its representations and 
simulations undo truth claims. On the other hand it must also be remarked that 
art is often the name for practices concerned with finitude (with mortality and 
so forth), and, more generally, cannot but concern itself with finite materials (it 
is a concrete rather than abstract practice in this sense). Art, as Félix Guatta-
ri once suggested, is necessarily a practice of the finite, but one that opens to-
wards the infinite. 
That said, clearly, art is not simply or narrowly technological—it does not 
produce anything ‘useful’ in this sense, but operates in a different paradigm (to 
reference Guattari once more, we might say an ethico-aesthetic paradigm as op-
posed to a techno-scientific one). If art practice has its own Promethean impulse 
this is not necessarily to further human evolution (even when this moves beyond 
the human per se)—or, indeed, to further the progress of reason. It is less teleo-
logically driven it seems to me (at least, since the end of a certain kind of Mod-
ernism), involved in its own experimental constructions that draw as much on 
past resources as contemporary and future-orientated ones. Indeed, it is often 
this mobilization of what Raymond Williams once called the residual (alongside 
more emergent culture) that gives certain art practices their peculiar traction 
and political efficacy in the world (after all, the past (as well as the future) can be 
mobilized as a powerful resource against the impasses of the present).25 In fact, 
the present is never simply homogenous, temporally speaking, but involves a he-
teorogeneity of times (Raymond Williams’ writings provide a useful mapping of 
this complexity). This complex make up of the contemporary can sometimes be 
occluded in the accelerationist pre-occupation with the future.
As with Negarestani, the Promethean project is expounded in Brassier’s 
essay as ultimately the desire to ‘re-engineer’ the human itself (and, in this, 
as Brassier remarks, the project is again the direct successor to Enlightenment 
thought and practice, as most obvious in the pre-eminent Promethean thinker 
of modern times: Marx). In part this involves a refusal of transcendence and, 
instead, a kind of tracking of immanence via rule governed activity. To quote 
Brassier:
…rather than trying to preserve the theological equilibrium between the 
made and the given, which is to say, between immanence and transcend-
ence, the challenge for rationality consists in grasping the stratification of 
immanence, together with the involution of structures within the natural 
        25. I will be attending to this in a further essay on ‘Myth-Science as Residual Culture and Magical 
Thinking’—which, in part, will involve an encounter between Williams’ temporal mapping and Gil-
bert Simondon’s work on phase-shifts (the emergence of technicity from an originary magical mode of 
existence—and the latter’s contemporary analogue in aesthetics).
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order through which rules can arise out of physical patterns. According 
to this conception of rationality, rules are means of coordinating and sub-
suming heterogeneous phenomena, but means that are themselves histor-
ically mutable. (PC, p. 486)
We might ask here where this leaves a pursuit like art practice? Is it a 
rule-governed activity in this sense? More broadly we might ask (once again) 
whether art can be understood as producing any rational knowledge, even in 
the minimal sense of rule-governed behaviour? When it comes to art it seems to 
me that it might be better to replace this particular concept of rules (concerned 
with ‘coordinating and subsuming heterogeneous phenomena’) with a concept 
of rules that are more like protocols for experimentation.26 Rules as a means of 
‘going on’ in practice. 27 Indeed, art practice here is like a move in a game for 
which the precise rules, in fact, are unknown—or are made up as the ‘game’ 
progresses. This might, for example, involve the production of fictions within 
fictions (and so on). Ultimately this is to produce a kind of density, even an opac-
ity, built up by this nesting of one set of fictions in another. Art, when it is a prac-
tice, can constitute its own world in this sense. 
Brassier suggests that it might be Alain Badiou who opens the way for a con-
tinuing of this Promethean project in relation to the subject (albeit Badiou’s ac-
count of the subject and event would need to be linked, for Brassier, to ‘an anal-
ysis of the biological, economic, and historical processes that condition rational 
subjectivation’ (PC, p. 487)). In a sense Badiou is indeed the template insofar as 
philosophy, for Badiou, is not itself involved in the production of the subject (as 
opposed to art, politics and science), but, rather, is a reflection on these process-
es. Likewise, Brassier’s philosophy is really a meditation on science as Promet-
hean—rather than itself a form of Promethean practice—although, certainly, 
a different kind of scientific image of the subject is at stake in Brassier’s work.
In ‘The View from Nowhere’, Brassier turns his attention more explicitly to 
        26. Negarestani has something similar in mind when he writes about Moulène’s practice in relation 
to ‘protocols of cruelty’:
What Moulène calls ‘protocol’ when describing his modus operandi in making art is a performative 
system or germ of procedurality. It is a thought-manual furnished with materially influenced be-
haviours and evolving logics of operation. It is called protocol insofar as it governs the artist’s con-
duct according to entanglements between (normative) laws of thought, (representational) laws of im-
agination and (dynamic-natural) material laws. To follow protocol is to be prepared to change one’s 
approach in accordance with how interactions of matter and thought develop and how the space of 
abstraction is reorganized and diversified. In other words, the protocol offers new choices of disequi-
librium for the entanglement between thought, imagination and material (Reza Negarestani, ‘Tor-
ture Concrete’, p. 9).
In Brassier’s terms Negarestani’s definition of protocol is Promethean insofar as it involves the inro-
duction of a productive disequilibrium into the world.
        27. Brassier is certainly not oblivious to this idea that an experimental practice requires protocols—
rules—even if these are to do with what to avoid or negate. See for example his earlier essay ‘Genre 
is Obsolete’, Multitudes, no. 28, 2007, available at: http://www.multitudes.net/Genre-is-Obsolete/ (ac-
cessed 13th August 2015) that considers ‘Noise’ performances and practitioners in this respect. That said, 
for Brassier, ‘Noise’, when it is ‘successful’, is less about aesthetics or affect (or, indeed, ‘experience’) than 
about producing a certain cognitive dissonance and negation of genre (a ‘generic anomaly’ as Brassier 
puts it). Brassier links this in his essay to some developments in neuroscience—and thus, we might say, 
the essay gestures to more recent work (such as the essay in the footnote immediately below).
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this other mode or form of life—the nemocentric subject (a subjectivism without 
self )—that might be produced through the advanced operations of reason as it 
is manifested in neuroscience (this being a subject (if that is still a useful term) 
that shuttles between the folk and scientific image of the human).28 The account 
of this future non-self agent—‘a physical entity gripped by concepts: a bridge 
between two reasons, a function implemented by causal processes but distinct 
from them’—is compelling (as is the critique of phenomenology), but is it not 
also the case that the rational (and communist) Promethean project—especial-
ly as manifest in science—needs must be married with a more affective—libid-
inal—type of engineering (that deals with desire), and would it not be this kind 
of encounter and experimental conjunction that really produces a radically dif-
ferent kind of subject? 
And what about the theme of fictioning in all this? Would these new forms 
of life need new kinds of fiction (different kinds of narrative and/or image as co-
hering devices)—or, perhaps, it is in fiction itself (rather than philosophy) that we 
might actually find blueprints and prototypes of these new forms. Science Fiction 
is clearly an important resource in this respect. Indeed, towards the end of ‘Pro-
metheanism and its Critics’ Brassier himself turns to J. G. Ballard for future-ev-
idence of this new kind of human who, as it were, both engenders and is engen-
dered by the Promethean project. Ballard’s protagonists live a Prometheanism 
that is far from comfortable, or, indeed predictable (‘the psychic and cognitive 
transformations undergone by Ballard’s protagonists are nothing if not savage 
and violent’ (PC, p. 486)). In fact, these characters—could we call them Brassier’s 
conceptual personae?—are also libidinal figures (Ballard’s novels track this oth-
er alien, often inorganic sexuality). They are inventions, experimental configura-
tions of reason and affect given proper names—forms of synthetic life that might 
be gestured towards in philosophy, but are given life in art.29 
MYTHOTECHNESIS (AS PATHEME-MATHEME) 
In a short commentary on the ‘Manifesto for Accelerationist Politics’ An-
tonio Negri lends his support to a renewed accelerationism, but also gestures to 
certain caveats such as the overly technologically determined nature of the the-
sis, and to certain key omissions such as a consideration of the commons and 
questions to do with the production of subjectivity, including ‘the agonistic use 
of passions’.30 For myself, following on from my commentaries above, this last 
        28. Ray Brassier, ‘The View from Nowhere’, Identities: Journal of Politics, Gender and Culture, vol. 8, no. 
2, 2011, pp. 7-23.
        29. Ballard’s books are, precisely, of the imagination in this sense. In fact, ultimately, for Brassier, 
the imagination has a part to play in Prometheanism, which cannot but have a phantasmagoric aspect 
(albeit one that might be diagnosed, analysed and, presumably, ‘cured’): ‘Prometheanism promises an 
overcoming of the opposition between reason and imagination: reason is fuelled by imagination, but it 
can also remake the limits of imagination’ (PC, p. 487).
        30. Antonio Negri, ‘Some Reflections on the Manifesto’, in Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian 
(eds.), #Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2014, pp. 365-78. There is also Patri-
cia Reed’s critical commentary, ‘Seven Prescriptions for Accelerationism’, in Robin Mackay and Ar-
men Avanessian (eds.), #Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2014, pp. 523-36, 
which points to a number of possible variations and further accelerations of the Manifesto, perhaps 
most interestingly (at least in the context of my own essay) the call to ‘fictionalize’. For Reed this is tied 
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theme is perhaps the most crucial missing aspect of accelerationism (and, in-
deed, of any aesthetics that leads from this) at least as the latter is presented in 
the essays by Negarestani and Brassier or, indeed, in the Manifesto which might 
be said to be a political instantiation of the philosophical work. Indeed, more of-
ten than not the focus of recent accelerationism is specifically not the affective 
make up of subjectivity—with claims, rather, about the latter’s obsolescence, es-
pecially in the wake of the ‘rise of the machines’, the foregrounding of only the 
rational subject, or, as in the Manifesto, the offering of no detail on this crucial 
area beyond a passing swipe at ‘affective self-valorization’.31 
In relation to an explicit politics, this non-engagement with the affective 
complexities of life means accelerationism offers only a partial picture of the is-
sues and problems at hand—and, indeed, of their possible solutions. For capi-
talism is not just an abstract inhuman agency ‘out there’, instantiated in forms 
of technology, and so forth (that is, as a supra-molar entity). It is also ‘in here’—
producing our very subjectivity on what we might call a molecular level. Cap-
italism goes all the way down, determining our affective states, as well as our 
very desires, dreams and the contours of our innermost worlds. Subjectivity, 
then, is not solely a rational business in this sense or, at least, those aspects not 
involved in the project of reason are also crucial to our sense of who and what 
we are—or, indeed, what we might become.
Any subjectivity ‘beyond’ capitalism (even one produced from within the 
latter) will have to deal with this, and, indeed, get involved in the whole com-
plex mess of being alive, not least addressing the various affective tonalities that 
capitalism engenders (from an omnipresent ambient anxiety, to resentment and 
depression, to all out paralysing fear). It will not be enough to take on—or com-
mit to—a new set of ideas, or put our faith solely in technological progress; sub-
jectivity has to be produced differently at this level. This is not to say that giving 
attention to this area is the most important aspect of any ethico-political project 
today, but it is to say that without an account of (and experimentation with) the 
affective production of subjectivity (very broadly construed), any diagnosis of 
the problems produced in and by capitalism, or strategy to deal with them (in-
cluding a renewed Prometheanism), remains too abstract (or, remains abstract 
in only a partial way).32 
to the production of a new demos, or new collective will and, more generally to the role of belief within 
any radical politics. In relation to my own take on accelerationism, Reed also points to the need both 
to attend to the ‘distribution of affect’ in any accelerationist agenda (‘in equal partnership with calls for 
operational, technological and epistemic restructuration’) and to the more Guattarian idea of a ‘com-
mitment to an eccentric future’ (although it is not entirely clear what Reed has in mind here) (Patricia 
Reed, ‘Seven Prescriptions’, p. 528 and 527). 
        31. Nick Srnicek and Alex William, ‘Manifesto’, p. 351. 
        32. To a certain extent all this is also the business of schizoanalysis especially as Guattari understood 
it—as a form of expanded analysis and accompanying experimental technology of the subject (involv-
ing non-human encounters as well as other models of and for a non-typical (and non-standard) sub-
jectivity). I go into more detail on this in the section on ‘Mapping the Diagonal: on the Production of 
Subjectivity’ of my review mentioned in footnote 4 where I suggest that Guattari’s writings might offer 
the missing framework for thinking a post-capitalist subjectivity (in this regard see especially Guatta-
ri’s ‘The New Aesthetic Paradigm’, in Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, trans. Paul Bains and Ju-
lian Pefanis, Sydney, Power Publications, 1995, pp. 98-118).
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It is important to note that this does not imply the reinstatement of a phe-
nomenological self that experiences the world (an individual that has the affects) 
nor, a straightforward vitalism that is pitched against a colder abstraction. Af-
fects—or becomings—are themselves abstract. They take the subject out of 
themselves—or they involve the irruption of something different—non-hu-
man—within the subject (when ‘human’ names a very particular historical 
configuration and self model). Indeed, molecular encounters—that might well 
involve the biological and chemical in conjunction with the technological and 
digital—produce unforeseen compounds that themselves are generative of oth-
er forms of thought and, indeed, themselves determine what thinking itself 
might become.33 
It is here where the conceptual meets these other kinds of thought (defined 
in its broadest possible sense) that we might then find a role for art practice un-
derstood as also a technology of the inhuman (the production of something that 
does not—as Jean-François Lyotard once put it—offer a reassuring image to 
and of a subjectivity already in place). But also as a practice that attends to, and 
experiments with, the different registers of subjectivity, including, crucially (but 
not exclusively), the affective. Here art’s ability to produce that which was previ-
ously unseen and unheard, untimely images and other forms that ‘speak’ back 
to us—as if they came from an elsewhere—is especially important and, again, 
takes on a political character (the imaging/imagining of alternatives). These 
other, perhaps stranger, image-worlds and fictions are an address not to us, but 
to something within us (or, to the collectivity that we are ‘behind’ any standard-
ized molar identity).34
Besides the essay by Alex Williams with which I began this article (itself 
part of a special e-flux issue on ‘Accelerationist Aesthetics’)—and the inclusion of 
an extract from Shulamith Firestone’s The Dialectics of Sex in #Accelerate: the Accel-
erationist Reader—there is little to be found in core accelerationist texts that sig-
nificantly addresses the issue of aesthetic production itself, and even with Fires-
tone the latter is seen as something to be overcome as technology renders the 
utopian imaging of art redundant.35 In fact, it seems to me, accelerationism does 
not really have a place for art practice, tending to position it as secondary—at 
        33. Deleuze writes well on these new kinds of compound, or folds, in the appendix of his book on Fou-
cault, trans. Sean Hand, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1988, pp. 124-32.
        34. In relation to this idea of art’s inhospitableness to the already constituted subject (but that never-
theless offers something) see my ‘Art Practice as Fictioning (or, myth-science)’, diakron, no. 1, 2014, avail-
able at: http://www.diakron.dk (accessed 13 August 2015).
        35. There is, however, an increasing amount of essays and publications on aesthetics and Specula-
tive Realism—some of which, such as the anthology on Speculative Aesthetics (Robin Mackay, Luke Pen-
drell and James Trafford (eds.), Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2014), contain writing directly related to an ac-
celerationist agenda (indeed, the latter volume contains a contribution by Brassier amongst others, that 
ends with this intriguing reflection: 
… perhaps it’s not so much a question of pitting the conceptual against the aesthetic, or concepts 
against affects, but of developing a conception of aesthetics which is not exclusively governed by ei-
ther: one dedicated to reconstructing sensation on the basis of new modes of conceptualization. A 
Promethean constructivism will engineer new domains of experience, and it is these new domains 
that will need to be mapped by a reconfigured aesthetics (Ray Brassier, ‘Prometheanism and Real 
Abstraction’, p. 77.).
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best a forerunner to the real business of technological development, a poor cous-
in to philosophy.
But art practice—especially today, and more generally since the expand-
ed field of the 1960s (if not post Duchamp)—is more than just this folk image. 
Indeed, as I suggested above, it involves its own experiments and navigation-
al strategies that parallel the rational and technological and even, in some re-
spects (in terms of the production of images and fictions) outrun it. It is also with 
art, or with aesthetic productions more generally, that we see real attempts at li-
bidinal engineering—again, forms of synthetic life. These more expanded and 
performative practices can involve the kind of conjunctions I also gestured to 
above: non-human becomings (animal, plant … molecular) alongside, for exam-
ple, other experiments in and with digitally produced sound and image and, in-
deed, with what has become known as a ‘post-media aesthetics’ in general. This 
is to say nothing of practices that might involve even stranger conjunctions be-
tween man and machine, especially around biology, coding and algorithms—
or, to return to some of my comments above, practices that might utilize the 
residual alongside the emergent (or even pre-emergent). In these kinds of ‘per-
formative fictions’ desire is invested and mobilised in a manner rarely encoun-
tered within more narrowly focused conceptual work. Might we reiterate the 
claim I made earlier in this essay that art practice in this sense is itself Promet-
hean (precisely, artifice)? 
In this respect I am very much in agreement with Patricia Reed’s critical 
commentary that ends the #Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader, and which takes 
the ‘Manifesto for an Accelerationist Politics’ to task for, amongst other things, 
not attending to the constructive project of imagining alternatives (to ‘eccentri-
cate’ as Reed puts it), and also, in fact, to the editors’ own call (towards the end 
of their ‘Introduction’) for ‘new science-fictional practices, if not necessarily in 
literary form’.36 Although, in the ‘Introduction’ the claim is made that the more 
recent accelerationist treatises are a response to a situation in which the polemics 
and experiments of a 1990s cyberculture have been blunted, then assimilated, 
in web 2.0 and the general algorithmic character of social media (and, indeed, 
that these essays are intended as a mapping out of something more conceptu-
al as a corrective to that other more aesthetic scene), nevertheless it remains the 
case that something has been lost in the sole focus on the rational (even when, 
as with Brassier and Negarestani, this might involve more speculative kinds of 
reason and also imply a kind of human/inhuman subject). In fact, once again, 
my suspicion is that this omission is also apparent to the editors of the Read-
er themselves. Why else end the ‘Introduction’—after an account of how a ma-
chine-produced ‘transformative anthropology’ requires a newly thought ration-
al subject—with the claim, entirely correct in my opinion, that this latter subject 
will also need to be a vitalist one?37
Elsewhere David Burrows and I have attempted to map out some of this ter-
rain analytically, in terms of patheme-matheme assemblages, where the former 
        36. Patricia Reed, ‘Seven Prescriptions’, p. 524; Mackay and Avanessian, ‘Introduction’, p. 37.
        37. Mackay and Avanessian, ‘Introduction’, p. 46.
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names the formal (or we might say vertical) character of subjectivity, and the 
latter names an equally abstract—though in a different sense—more vitalist, 
‘creaturely’ and affective character (something more horizontal).38 The reader 
will recognize both Lacan and Guattari here, and, indeed, our intention was to 
produce a transversality between the two—to metamodelize (to use Guattari’s 
phrase) these two analysts. This experimental diagramming—when it is drawn 
out, but also performed—is also, it seems to me, a kind of schizoanalysis. Or, in 
fact—and following François Laruelle—a non-schizoanalysis (it uses the tools 
and models of schizoanalysis but not necessarily for therapeutic aims).
In terms of the Lacanian matheme we might suggest a resonance with cer-
tain aspects of accelerationism, especially that of Negarestani and Brassier, 
insofar as, in Lacan’s terms, the matheme is a kind of inhuman—again, for-
mal—parasite on its animal host. Indeed, the matheme, especially as it is lat-
er developed and deployed by Badiou, is that which renders the human animal 
subject. In terms of the patheme, once again, it seems to me that this is the miss-
ing subject of more recent accelerationist texts. But it is also worth noting that 
certain pre-cursors to accelerationism had a pathic aspect—or, again, an affec-
tive charge, as I suggested in this essay’s companion piece—on hyperstition and 
Nick Land.39
I mentioned Badiou above and, in fact, it seems to me that he—rather than 
Deleuze-Guattari—is a key progenitor of the inhumanism of recent accelera-
tionism insofar as Badiou is also explicitly not interested in the affective make 
up of subjectivity (and, indeed, follows a war of attrition against the human an-
imal).40 Badiou might be said to be on the side of accelerationism (if it makes 
sense to take sides) in so far as he affirms a subjective process that is alien to 
the human animal itself. That said, Badiou does, of course, offer a theory of 
the subject (this is at the core of his philosophical œuvre), and, as such, it might 
be argued that Badiou himself offers us the missing subject of accelerationism. 
Certainly Negarestani’s labour of the inhuman has something in common with 
both Badiou’s fidelity to an event (in Being and Event) and his ‘Living for an Idea’ 
(in Logics of Worlds) and Brassier, as we saw in the previous section of this essay, 
refers to Badiou when thinking about the relation between a renewed Promet-
        38. See ‘S/Z or Art as Non-Schizoanalysis’, in Ian Buchanan and Lorna Simpson (eds.), Schizoanaly-
sis and Art, London, Bloomsbury, pp. 253-78. In this essay we also attempt a metamodelization of Guat-
tari (specifically his four ontological functions) with the late Lacan’s RSI knot (Lacan’s sinthome is also 
allied with what we call a ‘mytheme’ that might function as kind of cohering device for an art practice). 
Many of the ideas that follow—on mythotechnesis specifically—were developed with Burrows and in 
the context of our collaborative art practice—or ‘performative fiction’—Plastique Fantastique (see www.
plastiquefantastique.org).
        39. See footnote 1.
        40. Things are, of course, more complex and overdetermined than this, with a whole cast of philo-
sophical precursors to accelerationism. Alongside Badiou, and in the distancing of Deleuze-Guatta-
ri, we might note, for example, for Negarestani, Wilfred Sellars and Robert Brandom; and for Brassier 
(as well as the previous) Thomas Metzinger and Paul and Patricia Chruchland (indeed, we might sug-
gest that accelerationism is at least partly characterized, philosophically speaking, as a synthesis be-
tween continental and analytic traditions (and departs from Speculative Realism, in this respect—as 
well as from those Object-Orientated trajectories that constitute the other main philosophical offshoot 
from the latter).
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heanism and a subject adequate and appropriate to this.
Could it be argued that what characterizes some aspects of more recent ac-
celerationism—as opposed to something more Landian—is the replacement of 
Deleuze-Guattari (and especially the thesis of Anti-Oedipus) with Badiou, and, 
with this, a foregrounding of the formal (and of mathematizeable thought in 
general)? It has often been argued that Deleuze is the key interlocutor for Badi-
ou, but, in relation to the matheme, I think it is really Guattari who is Badiou’s 
opposite insofar as Guattari attends specifically to the affective (as well as being 
precisely a non-philosopher).41 The basic philosophical-analytic schema looks 
something like this:
There is more to be said here, about two different trajectories of French 
thought, the animal (on the left) and the formal (on the right)—and both Brass-
ier and Badiou have written on this. An especially interesting line of thought is 
Deleuze’s difference to Lacan particularly around the idea of the unconscious.42 
Of particular note in the diagram is the figure of Spinoza as common root to 
both the philosophical and psychoanalytical categories, but also as purveyor 
of both the creaturely (affect) and the rational (reason), depending on what one 
reads of The Ethics and indeed how one reads it. We might map some of the ac-
celerationist texts, in particular Negarestani and Brassier, between Badiou and 
Lacan (insofar as both are philosophical, but also attend to a kind of subject (al-
beit, a rational one) which means they have an psychoanalytic aspect (though, 
crucially, no account of an unconscious)). This very partial and reductive sche-
ma (which leaves out any analytic philosophical precursors) also allows a more 
        41. For more on these distinctions see Chapter 3, ‘The Aesthetic Paradigm: From the Folding of the 
Finite-Infinite Relation to Schizoanalytic Metamodelization (to Biopolitics) (Guattari)’, and Chapter 4, 
‘The Strange Temporality of the Subject: Life In-between the Infinite and Finite (Deleuze contra Badi-
ou)’ of my On the Production of Subjectivity: Five Diagrams of the Finite-Infinite Relation, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012, pp. 89-124 and 125-168.
        42. For a fine study of this area see Christian Kerslake’s Deleuze and the Unconscious, London: Contin-
uum, 2007.
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pointed reflection on the differences between an accelerationism positioned on 
the right of the diagram (again, between Badiou and Lacan) with that on the 
left, between Deleuze and Guattari (where we might place Land and Ccru more 
generally). It also gestures, pace Spinoza, to a composite subject—between the 
right and left sides—and, more crucially, to what different composite subjects 
might look like.43
Art practice, it seems to me, can be involved in this kind of experimental 
and synthetic modeling. Again, this is not exactly a therapeutics (art practice 
does not have any kind of clinical responsibility in this sense). In fact, it is also, 
ultimately, not simply the production of subjectivity (at least when this is only 
narrowly construed), not least as it tends to produce something to be encoun-
tered by others. The essay I mentioned above—written with David Burrows—
develops the idea of art practice as a holding pattern for points of collapse in 
this sense —maintaining only a minimum consistency, whilst also operating as 
a scene of rupture. Indeed, such practices are not for a human subject that is al-
ready in place, or, at least, they threaten to undo this subject. But certainly these 
practices offer up something—different models, diagrams, performances—dif-
ferent fictionings—for more experimental modes of being (or becoming) in and 
with the world (for a subjectivity to come perhaps?).
If reason and science are of the matheme, broadly construed, which is to 
say the Promethean impulse in its rational and technological form, then mytho-
technesis might be a name for these practices that attend to a kind of vitalism 
alongside the more artificial constructs of the human, practices that involve an 
abstraction that is both formal and affective (or, to put this another way, mytho-
technesis is a diagonal between the rational and the animal). Any acceleration-
ism, it seems to me, will need to explore, and experiment with, this terrain—
participate in the construction of its own kinds of mythotechnesis, its own kinds 
of images and fictions, assemblages and figures, so that it might have a trans-
formative traction on the world, and especially on those who dwell within it.
If this mythotechnesis is part of what a ‘radical political response to capital-
ism’ might look like then these different synthetic forms of life will also need to 
express and capture our collective desires. They require, precisely, libidinal en-
gineering—as well as our participation in this. This project of reclaiming and 
then deploying a new collective—optical, aural and libidinal—unconscious is 
the necessary accompaniment, it seems to me, to any focus on reason and ra-
tionality and operates as a corrective to any faith in technological development 
as itself the sole progenitor of new and different ways of being in the world. 
        43. It seems to me that Mark Fisher’s writings are pertinent here—see in particular those on his blog 
at http://k-punk.org (accessed 15 August 2015)—especially in their prescient call for new libidinal fig-
ures adequate and appropriate to a reanimated Left (could we position Fisher on a transversal between 
Deleuze and Lacan?).
